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Corporate officers and directors currently owe duties only to the
corporation’s shareholders. This blindered focus on maximizing shareholder
value ignores historical precedent. Corporations originally, in the early 19th
century, had a duty to serve the public: the grant of limited liability to a
corporation was conditioned on the corporation’s achieving some public
purpose, such as building a canal or railroad. However, starting in the midnineteenth century, corporate apologists began conveniently overlooking
this traditional public duty. Populists in the early twentieth century revived
this duty by regulating corporations so that they acted in the public interest.
However, the deregulation movement of the 1970s ended regulation’s focus
on the public interest. Although corporations can now enjoy the corporate
form’s benefits, they no longer must bear its traditional responsibilities. A
corporation’s duty to serve the public interest should be restored. In
exchange for receiving limited liability, corporations, and their officers and
directors, should be required to serve the public purpose. This change would
be efficient and would protect non-shareholder stakeholders, such as workers
and the surrounding community, from inevitable vulnerability to corporate
decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Great corporations exist only because they are created and
safeguarded by our institutions; and it is therefore our right and our duty to
see that they work in harmony with these institutions.”1
“Neither this people nor any other free people will permanently
tolerate the use of the vast power conferred by vast wealth, and especially
by wealth in its corporate form, without lodging somewhere in the
government the still higher power of seeing that this power, in addition to
being used in the interest of the individual or individuals possessing it, is
also used for and not against the interests of the people as a whole.”2
It has become a commonplace in recent decades that a corporation’s
officers and directors owe duties only to the corporation’s shareholders: for
a corporate leader, professionalism means maximizing shareholder value.
1. President Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message, MILLER CENTER (Dec. 3,
1901), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-3-1901-first-a
nnual-message [https://perma.cc/KQ4W-PCFM].
2. President Theodore Roosevelt, Remarks at the Forty-Second Anniversary Banquet of
the Union League Club in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USCB THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Jan. 30, 1905), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-forty-sec
ond-anniversary-banquet-the-union-league-club-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/9GFB-HZW
4] (explaining why it is in the best interest of the United States to allow the Federal
government to control interstate commerce). See also DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, THE BULLY
PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF
JOURNALISM 446 (1905) (outlining Roosevelt’s return to private life after).
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As developed by conservative commentators such as Milton Friedman,
current legal doctrine suggests that the corporation’s leaders should comply
with existing substantive laws and contractual obligations, such as
environmental laws, laws designed to protect workers’ health, and labor
contracts.3 However, as long as the leaders comply with background legal
requirements and contractual obligations, they may single-mindedly pursue
profits.4 For example, suppose that a corporation is considering closing a
large factory, and that doing so would comply with background law and
labor contracts. The corporation is permitted to close the factory, even if the
closing would devastate the vulnerable surrounding community. Indeed, if
the closing would increase the corporation’s profits, the corporation’s leaders
might have a fiduciary duty to close it.
I here show that this view of what professionalism requires of corporate
leaders is unsound. The requirement that corporate leaders focus only on
shareholder value is flawed for two reasons. First, it permits corporations to
exploit vulnerable individuals and communities. For example, corporate
leaders can devastate a community by closing a factory, even though the
surrounding community has magnified the dangers of its vulnerability by
devoting itself for generations to the factory. Corporate ghost towns near
Detroit are examples.
Indeed, the rise of recent populist movements in the U.S. may be due
substantially to the freedom of corporations to abandon their vulnerable
workers and communities. The stereotypical populist voter lost his job when
his corporate employer closed his workplace, whether it be a coal mine in
Kentucky or steel plant in Pittsburgh. In 2016, these workers blamed
Democratic politicians for their suffering. Instead, the workers might have
blamed the corporate leaders who caused their employers to abandon them.
Second, the doctrine that corporate leaders must focus solely on profits
is not only bad policy, but it also ignores historical precedent. Instead, the
history of the development of the corporate form suggests that corporate
officers and directors should have an enhanced duty to obey the law and
serve the public good. Lawyers have such a duty, as “officers of the court.”5
Corporate officers and directors should too, as “officers of the public.”
Corporations originally had such a duty: two centuries ago, the grant of
limited liability to a corporation was conditioned on the corporation’s
3. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doc
trine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html updated [https://perma.cc/7J6A-SE4U].
4. Id.
5. See infra Part I (asserting that as officers of the legal system, lawyers are required to
pursue goals that are in the public interest).
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achieving some public purpose, such as building a canal or railroad.
However, starting in the mid-19th century through the Gilded Age and
continuing to today, corporate apologists such as Milton Friedman began
conveniently overlooking this traditional duty of corporations to promote a
public purpose.6
For a half a century, populists and New Dealers attempted, in effect, to
resuscitate this duty by creating administrative agencies that would regulate
corporations to force them to behave in the public interest.7 However, the
deregulation movement of the 1970s ended this attempt.8 At that point,
corporations had shaken off both their duty to serve the public and
meaningful regulation. They were now free to focus only on serving
shareholders.
The duty to serve the public should be restored. In exchange for
enjoying limited liability, corporations, and their officers and directors,
should have a duty to serve the public purpose. Just as some criminal acts
disqualify a person from serving as a lawyer, acts that harm the public
interest should disqualify people from serving as directors and officers of
corporations. If a corporate leader harms the public interest, the government
should have the authority both to remove them from their corporate position
and to eliminate their corporation’s limited liability.
In the last decades, and even more recently, there have been halting
suggestions that corporations assume obligations to more than shareholders.
First, some companies have chosen to become “benefit corporations,”
sometimes called B corporations.9 Second, a group of corporate leaders have
recently suggested that corporations should have duties to more than
shareholders.10
These initiatives are insufficient because they are voluntary and
unenforceable. In contrast, I propose mandatory duties that are fully
enforceable.
This proposal is conservative. It would conserve the duties that
traditionally accompanied the corporate form when it developed in the 18th
century. This reformed approach to what professionalism requires of a
corporate leader is necessary to ensure the flourishing not only of
6. See infra Part III (relating that for the first decades after the U.S. was founded,
corporations were required to promote the public interest).
7. See infra Part IV (recounting how a number of states and the federal government
attempted to reduce corporations’ harmful impacts through external regulation).
8. See infra Part V (examining the post-WWII movement toward deregulation).
9. See infra Part A. (discussing the thought and process behind a corporation’s decision
to incorporate as a B corporation).
10. See infra Part VII.B. (recounting the Business Roundtable’s 2019 statement urging
corporate leaders to consider a broader group of stakeholders).

2021]

NOT JUST PROFITS

827

corporations and their shareholders, but also of the vulnerable communities
that surround and support the corporations.
As discussed further in the bibliographical appendix below, over the
past decades in an ebb and flow of scholarly interest, various writers have
proposed other reasons that corporations should serve the public interest.
One approach is to argue that serving the public interest is also in the
corporation’s interest, so that an individual corporation should choose to
serve the public interest. For example, some papers argue that a
corporation’s acting in the public interest benefits the corporation’s
employees, causing the employees to be more productive for the
corporation—in turn increasing the corporation’s profits. Corporations
performing duties to stakeholders, including employees, can satisfy
employees’ psychological needs,11 solidify employees’ loyalty to the
corporation,12 deepen employee’s engagement,13 and inspire employees’
creativities,14 as well as appealing to prospective employees15 and improving
employee retention.16
11. See Ruth V. Aguilera, et al., Putting the S back in Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 836, 836
(2007) (explaining how the authors’ “model integrates theories of organizational justice,
corporate governance, and varieties of capitalism to argue that organizations are pressured to”
serve various stakeholders “by many different actors, each driven by instrumental, relational,
and moral motives.” The authors do not mention limited liability).
12. See Bradley R. Agle, et al., Who Matters to CEOs? An Investigation of Stakeholder
Attributes and Salience, Corporate Performance, and CEO Values, 42 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV.
507, 507 (1999) (outlining how the authors “found strong support for the attribute-salience
relationship and some significant relationships among CEO values, salience, and corporate
social performance but found no support for a salience-financial performance link. [Their]
findings suggest a need for continued emphasis on the development of normative stakeholder
theory.” The authors do not mention limited liability).
13. See Ante Glavas & Sandy K. Pidetit, How Does Doing Good Matter? Effects of
Corporate Citizenship on Employees, 36 J. OF CORP. CITIZENSHIP 51, 51 (2009) (discussing
how the authors “present a model of how corporate citizenship would affect employee
engagement, high-quality connections and creative involvement. . . . Findings from
regression analyses and structural equation modelling support the hypotheses that employees
who perceive higher levels of corporate citizenship will report higher levels of engagement,
high-quality connections and creative involvement.” The authors do not mention limited
liability).
14. Id.
15. See Daniel B. Turban & Daniel W. Greening, Corporate Social Performance and
Organizational Attractiveness to Prospective Employees, 40 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 658, 658
(1997) (concluding that the author’s “[r]esults indicate that independent ratings of corporate
social responsibility are related to firms’ reputations and attractiveness as employers,
suggesting that a firm’s corporate social responsibility may provide a competitive advantage
in attracting applicants.” The authors do not mention limited liability).
16. See generally David A. Jones, Does Serving the Community also Serve the Company?
Using Organizational Identification and Social Exchange Theories to Understand Employee
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Other papers argue that serving the public interest increases the
corporation’s profits by pleasing the corporation’s customers. Duties to
stakeholders can benefit customers’ favorable evaluations of the company
and its products17 and increase customers’ loyalty.18 Serving stakeholders
can improve a corporation’s reputation,19 goodwill,20 and organizational
identification.21
Other papers propose a duty to stakeholders grounded in social-contract
theory, based on the approach of Emanuel Kant. These papers suggest that
directors need to consider the stakeholder’s interests throughout the exercise
of their duties22 and organizational citizenship behavior, which are positively
Responses to a Volunteerism Programme, 83 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOL. 857 (2010) (suggesting that some employees reciprocate the benefits they receive
from a volunteerism program. The author does not mention limited liability).
17. See Tom J. Brown & Peter A. Dacin, The Company and the Product: Corporate
Associations and Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. OF MARKETING 68, 68 (1997) (arguing
that “what consumers know about a company can influence their beliefs about and attitudes
toward new products manufactured by that company . . . .” The authors do not mention limited
liability).
18. See Isabelle Maignan, et al., Corporate Citizenship: Cultural Antecedents and
Business Benefits, 27 J. OF THE ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI. 455, 455 (1999) (explaining why
the authors “suggest that market-oriented cultures as well as humanistic cultures lead to
proactive corporate citizenship, which in turn is associated with improved levels of employee
commitment, customer loyalty, and business performance.” The authors do not mention
limited liability).
19. See Stephen J. Brammer & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Reputation and Social
Performance: The Importance of Fit, 43 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 435, 435 (2006) (emphasizing
“the need to achieve a ‘fit’ among the types of corporate social performance undertaken and
the firm’s stakeholder environment. For example, a strong record of environmental
performance may enhance or damage reputation depending on whether the firm’s activities
‘fit’ with environmental concerns in the eyes of stakeholders.” The authors do not mention
limited liability).
20. See generally Marc Orlitzky et el., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A
meta-analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003) (outlining the use of a meta-analysis to evaluate
how corporate social responsibility affects corporate financial performance. The authors do
not mention limited liability).
21. See Abraham Carmeli, The Role of Perceived Organizational Performance in
Organizational Identification, Adjustment and Job Performance, 44 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 972,
972 (2007) (finding that “when compared to perceived market and financial performance,
perceived social responsibility and development had a larger effect on organizational
identification, which in turn resulted in enhanced employees’ work outcomes – adjustment
and job performance.” The author does not mention limited liability).
22. See Samuel Mansell, Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of Beneficence’, 117 J.
BUS. ETHICS 583, 583 (2012) (“This article draws on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant
to explore whether a corporate ‘duty of beneficence’ to non-shareholders is consistent with
the orthodox ‘shareholder theory’ of the firm. . . . The article concludes that it is possible
within the ethical framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the
happiness of non-shareholders. Furthermore, shareholders have a duty to hold management
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influenced by perceived legal citizenship and perceived ethical citizenship,
while negatively influenced by perceived discretionary citizenship.23
Specifically, some scholars contend that it is essential to use the citizenship
model and the compliance model together to achieve corporate social
responsibility.24
Likewise, some articles ground enhanced duties to stakeholders on
higher-order moral arguments,25 or a sense of stewardship.26
However, none of those papers uses this paper’s approach of grounding
the corporation’s duty to serve the public interest in reviving the historical
duty that corporations originally had to serve the public interest. There was
originally a quid of serving the public interest that the corporation had to
provide in order to receive the quo of limited liability.27 That quid pro quo
to account for the moral consequences of the firm’s activities on non-shareholding
stakeholders.” The author does not mention limited liability.).
23. See Chieh-Peng Lin, et al., Modeling Corporate Citizenship and its Relationship with
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors, 95 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 357, 357 (2010) (outlining the
author’s research “from the perspectives of social identity and resource allocation, by
examining the influence of corporate citizenship on organizational citizenship behaviors
(OCBs). . . . OCBs are positively influenced by perceived legal citizenship and perceived
ethical citizenship, while negatively influenced by perceived discretionary citizenship.” The
authors do not mention limited liability).
24. See Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility as Citizenship and
Compliance: Initiatives on the Domestic European and Global Level, 11 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP
85, 85 (2003) (contending that “corporate social responsibility consists of two related but
distinct models. . . . [T]he citizenship model, which views the company as an individual that
should be encouraged to exceed its minimum legal obligations. . . . [and] the compliance
model, which views the company as a public enterprise capable of exercising significant
power that can only be legitimated through the use of compulsory schemes. . . . [T]he
citizenship model has found favor with policy-makers . . . [but] when used in isolation, it will
fail to achieve consistent and broad-based reform of corporate activity. It is essential,
therefore, if CSR (corporate social responsibility) is to be achieved, that the citizenship and
compliance models be used in partnership.” The author does not mention limited liability).
25. See Aguilera et. al, supra note 11, at 836 (designing a model which “integrates
theories of organizational justice, corporate governance, and varieties of capitalism to argue
that organizations are pressured to engage in corporate social responsibility by many different
actors, each driven by instrumental, relational, and moral motives.” However, the authors do
not mention limited liability).
26. See James H. Davis, et al., Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 20, 20 (1997) (stating that “[e]conomic approaches to governance such as agency
theory tend to assume some form of homo-economicus, which depict subordinates as
individualistic, opportunistic, and self-serving. Alternatively, sociological and psychological
approaches to governance such as stewardship theory depict subordinates as collectivists, proorganizational, and trustworthy. . . . [They] attempt to reconcile the differences between these
assumptions by proposing a model based upon the subordinate’s psychological attributes and
the organization’s situational characteristics.” However, the authors do not mention limited
liability).
27. See infra Part III (relating that for the first decades after the U.S. was founded,

830

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:3

should be restored.
I proceed as follows. In Parts I and II, I discuss public duties in other
professions, and how, surprisingly, there is currently no such duty for
corporate officers. In Part III, I describe how, during the United States’ first
80 years, corporate charters required corporations to act in the public interest.
In Part IV, I explain how, when general incorporation laws supplanted
individual chartering, the government shifted to imposing external corporate
regulations that protected the public interest. In Part V, I discuss the decline
after World War II in corporate civic responsibility. Next, in Part VI, I
suggest that corporate officers should have a duty to manage corporations in
the public interest. After showing in Part VII that recent developments such
as benefit corporations and the recent statement by the Business Roundtable
are inadequate to create an appropriate duty, I discuss in Part VIII how my
proposed duty would increase the resiliency of vulnerable corporate
stakeholders. In Part IX I provide conclusions.
I. PUBLIC DUTIES IN OTHER PROFESSIONS
In professions other than business, professionals are required to work
not only for their own interests, but also for the public interest. For example,
lawyers in the United States are subject to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which prescribe three duties, only one of which promotes the
lawyer’s personal interest. The first sentence of the Rules, which
summarizes all that follows, indicates: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”28
The first duty, that the lawyer “is a representative of clients,” permits
the lawyer to pursue their own personal interest. This is, after all, how most
lawyers earn their livings: by representing clients.
However, the two other duties require lawyers to pursue goals that are
in the public interest, and they may conflict both with the lawyer’s selfinterested objectives and with the interests of the client. As “an officer of
the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice,” the lawyer is required to look out for the interests of the
public and the poor. The Rules require that:
[A] lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal
corporations were required to promote the public interest).
28. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble &
Scope, para. 1 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publ
ications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_prea
mble_scope/ [https://perma.cc/G637-W7VS] (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
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system, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned
profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond
its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and
work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer should
further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of
law and the justice system because legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and
support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be mindful
of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that
the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford
adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote
professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure
equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal
counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing
these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public
interest.29
The lawyer is not free to pursue their own self-interest. Instead, the
lawyer must balance their self-interest with public service. Sometimes,
conflicts exist between the lawyer’s self-interest and these duties of public
service:
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. . . .
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities
are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical
person while earning a satisfactory living.30
These requirements apply not only in the lawyer’s professional life, but
also in the lawyer’s private affairs. The Rules require that “[a] lawyer’s
conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional
service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”31
These requirements are not merely aspirational but are enforced—at
least at the beginning of lawyers’ careers. In applying for a license to
practice law, a person must reveal to the bar examiner any criminal arrests,
convictions, or other antisocial behavior that might suggest flawed character.
If any of these exist, the bar examiner can deny the person the license to
29. Id. para. 6.
30. Id. para. 8–9.
31. Id. para. 5.
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practice law, excluding them from the profession.
The existence of the lawyer’s duty to serve the public interest makes
sense. Being a lawyer is a privilege. The requirement of a legal license
provides lawyers who have one with a great benefit. They have a monopoly
on providing legal services. Anyone without a license who attempts to
compete with them is punished. In effect, the state gives lawyers a benefit—
the right to practice law—but requires something in return. Lawyers must
both behave better than others, and act to some degree, as officers of the
court, in the public interest.
This same requirement exists in most other professions where licensing
is required, such as for physicians and accountants. For example, the first
sentence of the leading international ethics code for accountants’ states: “A
distinguishing mark of the accountancy profession is its acceptance of the
responsibility to act in the public interest.”32 Again, this public-interest
requirement makes sense. Accountants are given the monopoly of providing
certain accounting services. In exchange, they must behave in the public
interest.
To sum up, we see that when the government provides benefits to
members of professions, it usually requires that, in return, the members of
that profession act, at least to some extent, in the public interest. As I now
discuss, this is not the current expectation for corporations and those who
manage them.
II. CORPORATE LEADERS’ CURRENT NARROW FOCUS ON ONLY PROFIT
Unlike with other professions, there is currently no requirement that
corporate officers act in the public interest. Instead, as I now discuss, current
doctrine generally requires corporate officers to focus instead on maximizing
shareholder value. Indeed, a corporate officer who sacrificed profits in order
to promote the public interest might well be violating his fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its shareholders. Instead, the corporate officer’s duty is
to use any legal means to enrich the corporation’s shareholders.
This duty of officers and directors to run a company so as to benefit

32. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS, Handbook of the International Code
of Ethics for Professional Accountants, (July 31, 2018), https://www.ifac.org/system/files/pub
lications/files/IESBA-Handbook-Code-of-Ethics-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7HF-Y5CU];
see also Jörgen Holmquist, Chair, IESBA, Speech at Accounting Professional & Ethical
Standards Board (APESB) Dinner | Sydney, Australia: Professional Accountants: A Legacy
of Serving the Public Interest (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.ethicsboard.org/news-events/20
13-09/professional-accountants-legacy-serving-public-interest [https://perma.cc/KC56-M8P
U] (expressing the accounting profession’s commitment to serving the public).
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shareholders was articulated over a century ago in the leading case of Dodge
v. Ford Motor Company.33 In the Dodge case, shareholders of Ford Motor
Company complained that the company was not providing large dividends.
Instead, the shareholders complained, the company was paying
unnecessarily high wages to its workers, while selling its cars at
unnecessarily low prices. Henry Ford, the head of Ford Motor Company,
admitted that he was paying high wages and charging low prices, claiming
that he was not trying to maximize profits, rather he was helping workers
and consumers. The court held that this was improper, ordering that
additional dividends be given to shareholders.34
Continuing in the line from Dodge, the current view that a corporate
officer’s sole duty is to maximize shareholder value was championed by
Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1976 and was
the leader of the so-called “Chicago School” of economics. He described his
views on the duties of corporate leaders:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive
is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct
the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will
be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.
. . . [T]he key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate
executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the
corporation . . . and his primary responsibility is to them. . . .
Of course, the corporate executive is also a person in his own right.
As a person, he may have many other responsibilities that he
recognizes or assumes voluntarily—to his family, his conscience,
his feelings of charity, his church, his clubs, his city, his
country. . . . If we wish, we may refer to some of these
responsibilities as “social responsibilities.” But in these respects
he is acting as a principal, not an agent; he is spending his own
money or time or energy, not the money of his employers or the
time or energy he has contracted to devote to their purposes.
If these are “social responsibilities,” they are the social
responsibilities of individuals, not of business. . . .
. . . [T]he doctrine of “social responsibility” [is] . . . a
“fundamentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, and [I] have
33. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (deciding that while the goal of a
corporation is to make a profit, courts will not interfere with decisions that come under the
business judgment of directors).
34. Id. at 685.
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said that in such a society “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud.”35
This approach permits, and even requires, a corporation’s leaders to
focus intently on benefiting shareholders and to ignore the interests of the
corporation’s other vulnerable stakeholders. For example, suppose that a
corporate officer managed a corporation that employed 15,000 workers in a
small town with no other major employers, but that the factory had become
less profitable than the company’s other factories. The duties created by
corporate law might require the corporation’s leaders to close the factory,
even though that decision would destroy the lives of 15,000 workers and
their families. If they decided to continue with the factory to help the
workers, the corporation’s leaders might be violating their legal duties to
their shareholders.
Likewise, suppose that manufacturing cigarettes was a corporation’s
most profitable line of business. The law would probably require the
corporation’s leaders to continue manufacturing the cigarettes, despite
cigarettes’ harms.
Currently, it is generally accepted that corporate leaders should not
sacrifice profits to help society. Milton Friedman’s views have prevailed.
The Delaware courts have often reaffirmed this approach. The
Delaware courts are centrally important to corporate law because most large
corporations are incorporated in Delaware,36 and the law of a corporation’s
state of incorporation governs its internal affairs, including the relationship
between it and its shareholders.37 For example, in eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Craig Newmark, et al., the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a
non-financial mission that “seeks not to maximize the economic value of a
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” is
inconsistent with directors’ fiduciary duties.38 That is, the directors and
officers of a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware cannot legally
pursue goals other than furthering the interests of the corporation’s
shareholders.
35. Friedman, supra note 3.
36. DAVID EPSTEIN, RICHARD FREER, MICHAEL ROBERTS & GEORGE SHEPHERD, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 155 (5th ed. 2019) (discussing proportion of large corporations that are
incorporated in Delaware).
37. Id. at 173.
38. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (finding
that directors breached their fiduciary duties to minority shareholder).
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Normally, an officer or director would not be sued for failing to
maximize shareholder wealth. This is because a doctrine called the “business
judgement rule” prevents a lawsuit from succeeding against an officer or
director unless they have a conflict of interest or are otherwise attempting to
steal from the corporation.39 However, the protections of the business
judgement rule are weak in the context of a merger or takeover.40 Therefore,
a director or officer who pursued objectives other than shareholder
maximization would face substantial legal risk.
In addition, focusing on the public interest might cause the CEO to lose
their job. When the CEO failed to fulfill their duty to maximize profits for
shareholders, unhappy shareholders would have them fired. Or the resultant
declining stock price would make the corporation an enticing takeover target,
which again would result in the CEO being fired.
III. CORPORATE LEADERS’ EARLIER DUTY TO PROMOTE THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
It was not always this way. Instead, for the first decades after the U.S.
was founded, corporations were required to promote the public interest. A
leading history of the development of the corporation indicates that the law
governing corporations “consisted, from the very beginning, of a more
affirmative objective: that is, holding corporations to higher standards of
action, purpose, accountability, and public responsibility.”41
At the time of the country’s formation, the government strictly limited
the number of corporations.
This contrasts with today’s general
incorporation laws, under which anyone can incorporate their business as
long as they submit the required forms to the secretary of state, choose an
acceptable name, and pay the required fees. In the country’s early years, a
group could incorporate only if the group obtained from the legislature a
special corporate charter. The legislature had to pass special legislation
awarding the group the corporate form.
The country’s earliest corporate charters went to groups that were
viewed as acting squarely in the public interest. Some were corporations that
pursued religious goals. Other groups that obtained charters provided
39. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 236
40. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (stating that if a
purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy is to come
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed).
41. NAOMI LAMOREAUX & WILLIAM NOVAK, CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 16 (2017).
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education; during this period, state legislatures offered corporate charters to
Yale, Harvard, and other leading universities.42 Other corporate charters
went to charities.43
Legislatures then began to award corporate charters to groups of people
that promised to undertake projects that served the public interest in other
ways. In the late 18th century, the country needed many expensive physical
infrastructure improvements, such as roads, bridges, canals, and wharves.44
However, the country was averse to the government’s collecting taxes and
undertaking these projects itself.45 So instead of the government building the
roads, bridges, and canals, the government allowed groups of private citizens
to incorporate and undertake the projects themselves.46
The legislature’s grant of the charters was always an implicit, or even
explicit, quid pro quo. The legislatures induced the groups to undertake
projects that benefitted the public by offering the groups various benefits.
For example, a group that promised to build a canal, bridge, or road might
receive a monopoly right to collect tolls and would be entitled to use the
government’s power of eminent domain to acquire necessary land.47 A
charter for a textile company included tax exemptions and the right to raise
money through a public lottery.48
Importantly, starting in the early 1800s, all of the corporate charters
provided the group with limited liability. In a corporation with limited
liability, the corporation’s owners are not liable for the corporation’s
obligations.49 This limited liability is essential to the business’s ability to
assemble the large amounts of money that are necessary to fund large
projects. Only if a business has limited liability will the necessary large
numbers of people be willing to invest in the business. In contrast, if liability
is unlimited, as with a partnership, there is a substantial risk that even a small
investment will lead to financial ruin for the investor. For example, assume
that a partnership, which lacks limited liability, sought to raise the $100
million that would be necessary to build a bridge. Suppose also that a
42. See generally Bruce A. Campbell, Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The
Formation of Constitutional Policy, 70 KY. L.J. 643 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
formulation of the Dartmouth College doctrine).
43. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 7.
44. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 7–8.
45. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 8.
46. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 48–49 (illustrating that most incorporations
at the time were to provide transportation infrastructure).
47. Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights,
in LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 214.
48. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 8.
49. See infra Part III (discussing the development of limited liability in the United States).
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wealthy investor, with assets of $40 million, was considering investing
$10,000 for a part ownership interest in the partnership. The investor would
have a large incentive not to make the investment. This is because, if the
partnership failed, the investor might lose not only their $10,000 investment,
but also all of their other wealth. The owners of a partnership are generally
jointly and severally liable for all of a partnership’s obligations. Suppose
that the partnership went bankrupt with obligations of $40 million. The
partnership’s creditors could seek to recover all of the $40 million from the
investor who had invested only $10,000. That is, the investor’s $10,000
investment could cause the investor to lose their entire $40 million fortune.
Accordingly, the investor would not make the investment.
In contrast, the investor might make the investment if the business was
a corporation with limited liability, rather than a partnership. With its limited
liability, the corporation would allow the investor to put at risk only the
$10,000 that they invested, not their whole fortune.
Thus, limited liability is essential for the corporation to succeed.
Without limited liability, the corporation has no chance of assembling the
large amounts of funding that would be necessary to achieve a large project.
Without limited liability, a business could not build a road, bridge, or canal.
The quid-pro-quo deal that the government struck with the business was
that the government would provide various benefits to the corporation, an
important example of which was limited liability. In return, the corporation
would agree to create some project in the public interest that the government
desired, such as a road, bridge, or canal. That is, the government always
received something important in return for its grant of limited liability: the
corporation’s commitment to behave in the public interest to build the road,
bridge, or canal.
Such civic-minded behavior was essential because corporations could
become immensely powerful. If corporate leaders led their corporations in
the public interest, then corporations could be a powerful force for good. If
not led in the public interest, then corporations could create great harms.
Starting in the early 19th century, abuses of the chartering process began
to become apparent.50 The process was subject to monopoly and corruption.
Businesspeople would bribe legislators to grant them monopoly charters.
The monopolies would permit the corporations to exclude competitors and
to raise prices to consumers.
The abuses were especially frequent with banks and transportation
companies. Monopoly banks would control the currency and credit to

50. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 42–43.
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consumers’ disadvantage.51 Monopoly transportation companies would raise
tolls to excessive levels.52
During the Jacksonian period in the 1820s and 1830s, anger at the
special charters grew sufficiently that many state governments eliminated
their legislatures’ right to grant special charters.53 The possible substitutes
for special charters that states contemplated were either eliminating
incorporation or expanding it to anyone who sought it. Some argued that the
corporate form itself caused harms, not merely the opportunities for
corruption in the process for awarding special charters.54 The reform that
these people sought was to eliminate the corporate form completely.
Others argued instead that only the process for special charters was
defective, rather than the corporate form itself. They argued that the
corporate form should be provided to anyone who asked for it; the legislature
would no longer involve itself in deciding to whom it should be awarded.
The second group prevailed. State after state began passing “general
incorporation laws.” By 1865, general incorporation laws had spread
throughout most of the nation. Anyone who wanted to incorporate could do
so by filing forms with the secretary of state and paying fees.55
Some legislators initially were worried that wide availability of the
corporate form would lead both to abuses and to corporate conduct that was
not in the public interest. Thus, many of the first general incorporation laws
included limits on corporate conduct to prevent abuses.56 That is, general
51. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
53–64 (1957) (discussing the repeal of the Bank of North America’s charter
for showing favoritism to select consumers); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the
American Corporation, THE WILLIAM & MARY Q. 51, 67 (1993) (relating how bank charters
bestowed upon banks privileges that “the great mass of people cannot exercise”).
52. See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1990) (examining how a company raised tolls for the Charles
River Bridge); Bruce A. Campbell, John Marshall, the Virginia Political Economy, and the
Dartmouth College Decision, 19 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 40 (1975) (discussing a corporations’
ability to set toll rates).
53. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 9–11 (providing examples of
restrictions to different corporations’ charters).
54. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 12.
55. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 392 n.36–38 (listing charter petitions
in the non-business context from the states of Pennsylvania and New York).
56. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 10; see generally Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi
R. Lamoreaux, Voluntary Associations, Corporate Rights, and the State: Legal Constraints
on the Development of American Civil Society, 1750– 1900 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21153, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2604
834 [https://perma.cc/9Z6L-ZRXR] (providing a general overview of the restrictions imposed
by states); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Revisiting American Exceptionalism: Democracy and the
Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Pennsylvania in
THE CIVIL WAR
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incorporation statutes continued the requirement that had existed in special
charters that corporations act in the public interest. As the leading history of
the development of corporate law notes:
The dominant American legal tradition involving corporations was
not only one of restricting corporations to a more limited set of
rights than humans. It also consisted, from the very beginning, of
a more affirmative objective: that is, holding corporations to
higher standards of action, purpose, accountability, and public
responsibility. The early American corporation regime just
discussed, in both its special charter and general incorporation
guises, was not merely concerned with creation, proliferation, and
access. . . . [C]harters and general incorporation statutes were
filled with legislative conditions, political reservations, and special
regulatory mandates.57
This meant that corporations were not initially private profit-making
machines, as they are viewed today. Instead, the state permitted a
corporation to exist only if it and its leaders furthered the public interest. As
the leading history concludes about the first 90 years of the corporation’s
existence after the country’s founding: Such special regulatory provisions
for bridge, turnpike, canal, railroad, insurance, and banking corporations
were the basis for Willard Hurst’s influential observation that most early
American corporations were essentially public service franchises.58

Comparative Context, in ENTERPRISING AMERICA: BUSINESSES, BANKS, AND CREDIT MARKETS
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25 (William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo eds. 2015) (arguing
that the reason that until the late twentieth century, businesses in the United States had a
narrower range of forms from which to choose than their counterparts in other countries,
resides in the interplay between the early achievement of universal (white) manhood suffrage
and elite efforts to safeguard property rights); Eric Hilt, Corporation Law and the Shift
Toward Open Access in the Antebellum United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21195, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2610
492 [https://perma.cc/E28M-HALX] (analyzing the general incorporation statutes for
manufacturing firms adopted by American states up to 1860).
57. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 16.
58. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 16 (emphasis added); see also infra notes
108-109 and accompanying text (discussing the history of corporate duties).
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IV. THE TRANSITION FROM INTERNAL DUTIES FOR CORPORATE
LEADERS TO EXTERNAL REGULATION
The requirements of “holding corporations to higher standards of
action, purpose, accountability, and public responsibility” so that “most early
American corporations were essentially public service franchises” soon
faded away as states began to compete to attract businesses to incorporate in
their states.59 Corporate law’s “internal affairs rule” specifies that what goes
on inside a corporation is governed by the law of its state of incorporation,
not the law of where it does business.60 As general incorporation laws spread
among the states, corporations began choosing to incorporate in the states
that imposed the fewest restrictions. In turn, the states with substantial
restrictions had no choice but to eliminate their restrictions, for fear of losing
more incorporations to states that were more lenient.61
This meant that, beginning in the Gilded Age in the 1890s, corporations
shed the requirements of acting in the public interest that had, until then,
been imposed either by special charters or by the earlier general
incorporation statutes. But the corporations still enjoyed a main benefit that
the corporate form provided: limited liability. Corporations kept the quo, but
no longer needed to provide the quid.62
Supporting corporate interests in the movement away from requiring
corporations to act in the public interest was the relentless legal pressure that
corporations applied, aided by elite lawyers. With tireless persistence, both
corporations and groups representing corporate interests would seek to
protect their interests through litigation. In these lawsuits, the corporations
were represented by the country’s best lawyers, such as Daniel Webster.63
As a leading history notes:
With equal accuracy, Webster could also have been called the
Defender of the Corporation. Throughout his career, Webster’s
clients were among the wealthiest businesses in the nation. They
59. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 16.
60. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 173.
61. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 12 (discussing the impact on
competition among states for corporate charters on the nature of the states’ corporate law);
William Carney & George Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,
2009 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1 (analyzing the dominance of Delaware corporate law).
62. See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in
the Progressive Era and the New Deal, in LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 109–138
(examining the results of the liberalization of corporate chartering).
63. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS 71 (2018) (exploring the role played by elite lawyers and litigation in securing
advantages for corporations).
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included manufacturers, mercantile companies, insurance
companies, railroads, banks, and shipping houses; “businessmen
of every type engaged his services.”
Webster was the
Corporation’s Lawyer, and in many of the cases that made him
famous he argued for broad protections for corporations under the
Constitution.64
The escape of corporations from strict incorporation laws did not end
attempts to constrain corporations’ harmful impacts. Because states’
incorporation laws no longer required corporations to act in the public
interest, states and the federal government attempted to reduce corporations’
harmful impacts through external regulation. In the 40 years from 1890 until
the beginning of the Great Depression, the federal government and most
states passed antitrust laws;65 the Federal Trade Commission was created in
1914, and modern corporate regulatory tax policy was developed.66 That is,
under leaders such as populist Theodore Roosevelt, external regulation
replaced the state’s initial internal regulation of corporations that had
occurred through chartering and restrictive general incorporation laws. As
noted by the leading history:
it would be a historical mistake to suggest that corporate regulation
in America began in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.
To the contrary, it has always been there. Nonetheless, it is
important to recognize and explain the significant shifts in legal
and political technology that occurred as the United States moved
from a corporate regulatory regime focused primarily on state
special charters and general incorporation laws to the brave new
world launched by the emergence of public utilities, antitrust law,

64. Id. at 71–72.
65. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916) (discussing the FTC’s
role in enforcing federal antitrust laws); HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK JR., TRUST
AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929) (examining antitrust
laws at the state level); A Collection and Survey of State Anti-trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L.R. 347
(1932) (surveying state antitrust laws); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880–1918,
135 UNIV. PA. L.R. 495 (1987) (analyzing the judicial treatment of constitutional challenges
to state antitrust enforcement in the era prior to the end of WWI); see also LAMOREAUX &
NOVAK, supra note 41, at 14 (discussing the Supreme Court’s support for state antitrust
efforts).
66. Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Personhood, and the Corporation in Politics, in
LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 16 n.66 (listing works that discuss modern corporate
regulatory policy in a number of different contexts such as: public utilities, antitrust and
competition and taxation).
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modern competition policy, and regulatory taxation.67
As corporations’ influence in society grew, Theodore Roosevelt
emphasized the central lesson from this paper: that because corporations
existed only because the government allowed them to, corporations had a
duty to act in the public interest. If corporations strayed from this duty, then
it was appropriate for the government to step in and force the corporations
back in line.
Accordingly, in his first annual message to congress, Roosevelt noted,
“[g]reat corporations exist only because they are created and safeguarded by
our institutions; and it is therefore our right and our duty to see that they
work in harmony with these institutions.”68 Likewise, Roosevelt noted:
It is no limitation upon property rights or freedom of contract to
require that when men receive from Government the privilege of
doing business under corporate form, which frees them from
individual responsibility, and enables them to call into their
enterprises the capital of the public, they shall do so upon
absolutely truthful representations as to the value of the property
in which the capital is to be invested. Corporations engaged in
interstate commerce should be regulated if they are found to
exercise a license working to the public injury.69
Because the corporation existed only because of the privilege created
by the government, the government appropriately could compel the
corporation to act in the public interest:
Neither this people nor any other free people will permanently
tolerate the use of the vast power conferred by vast wealth, and
especially by wealth in its corporate form, without lodging
somewhere in the government the still higher power of seeing that
this power, in addition to being used in the interest of the
individual or individuals possessing it, is also used for and not
against the interests of the people as a whole.70
Thus, Roosevelt emphasized: “The great corporations which we have
grown to speak of rather loosely as trusts are the creatures of the State, and
the State not only has the right to control them, but it is duty bound to control
them wherever the need of such control is shown.”71
67. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 16.
68. Roosevelt, First Annual Address, supra note 1.
69. Roosevelt, First Annual Address, supra note 1.
70. Roosevelt, Remarks at the Forty-Second Anniversary Banquet of the Union League
Club, supra note 2; see also KEARNS GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 446 (2013) (outlining
Roosevelt’s return to private life after his presidency).
71. President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Kennedy Plaza, Providence, Rhode Island
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External regulation of corporations increased still further during the
New Deal. By 1937, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt had completed
the creation of the modern administrative state for controlling corporations.
Corporations were regulated by a host of administrative agencies and
initiatives, from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Sherman
Antitrust Act, new systems for corporate taxation, the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.72 During the 20th century’s first three
decades, progressive reformers also convinced the courts that many
corporations were “public utilities” that were required to operate in the
public interest.73
During the New Deal, the country’s zeal for regulating corporations
reflected and reinforced the understanding that corporate leaders should
manage their corporations in the public interest. “[A]t the height of the New
Deal, many large corporations like General Foods and General Electric
themselves adopted progressive reform rhetoric, ‘describing themselves not
so much as a competitive business entity but as an ‘institution’ infused with
all of the connotations of civic beneficence characteristic of other nonmarket entities, including hospitals, foundations, and even government
agencies.’”74 As before, it was appropriate that corporations further the
public interest, as a quid pro quo for their enjoyment of limited liability.
In the two decades after World War II, corporations continued with the
norm that corporations were not to focus solely on profits for shareholders.
Instead, corporate leaders frequently indicated that they had a duty to lead
their corporations in a way that also served the broad public interest.
Corporate leaders recognized that the corporation’s interests and the interests
of the country went together.
For example, in 1953, Charles Wilson had been nominated to be
President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense. Wilson, the president of
General Motors, had earlier led his company’s shift to war production during
World War II. During his confirmation hearings, he was asked if, as
Secretary of Defense, he would be willing to make a decision that was bad
for General Motors. He responded by saying that there would never be such
a conflict “because for years I thought what was good for our country was

(Aug. 23, 1902) in 17 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 103 (1910).
72. See LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 19 (reviewing the history of the rise of
government regulation of business).
73. William Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business
Regulation, in LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 139.
74. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 23.
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good for General Motors, and vice versa.” 75 That is, he was saying that he
would serve his company best by serving the public interest. He recognized
that corporations can flourish only when their countries also flourish.76
V. THE POSTWAR DECLINE OF CORPORATE CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY
Starting in the decades after World War II, the understanding that
corporations had civic responsibility came under attack. Friedrich Hayak
argued that excessive regulation of corporations would destroy democracy.77
Gary Becker and colleagues in the new “Chicago School” of law and
economics argued that regulation of corporations should be eliminated
because it did more harm than good.78 Shareholder primacy should govern
the decisions of corporate leaders, not civic responsibility. The magic of
markets would ensure that a focus on maximizing shareholder value would
also benefit society. As Milton Friedman famously said, “The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits.”79
During recent decades, this view has prevailed. Leading textbooks on
the law of business associations feature Friedman’s approach.80 It is now
widely believed that corporate leaders have no duty to promote the public
interest.81 Instead, as long as they comply with existing laws, corporate
leaders should single-mindedly pursue maximum profits, in order to
maximize shareholder value. If closing a factory will increase a
corporation’s profits, then the corporation’s leader should close the factory,
even if the closing destroys the vulnerable community that surrounds the
factory. If cigarettes are profitable, then the corporation’s leader should
cause the corporation to make them and advertise them heavily to vulnerable
youth to get them addicted.
The extreme to which this approach now dominates is seen in the

75. Gautam Makunda, ‘What’s Good for GM is Good for America’ — What Should You
Do During a National Crisis?, FORBES (June 5, 2020, 3:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sit
es/gautammukunda/2020/06/05/whats-good-for-gm-is-good-for-americawhat-should-youdo-during-a-national-crisis/?sh=5d5aff96d3bd [https://perma.cc/UV7R-MCXL].
76. Id.
77. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (warning of the
dangers that result from governmental control of economic decision-making); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (arguing that economic freedom is a
precondition for political freedom).
78. Gary S. Becker, “Competition and Democracy,” 1 J.L. & ECON. 105, 109 (1958).
79. Friedman, supra note 3.
80. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 15 (discussing Milton Friedman’s
economic theories).
81. Friedman, supra note 3.
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Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, both
of these which hold that a corporation has the same rights as an individual,
with no additional civic duties or responsibilities.82
Strengthening this shaking off of corporate responsibility to the public
was the deregulation movement of the 1970s and 1980s.83 Responding to the
theories of Chicago-School economists, state and federal governments
ceased regulating many industries. Examples, among many others, were the
airlines and railroads.84
The end result was that neither inherent duties nor government
regulation required corporations to act in the public interest any longer.
VI. CORPORATE LEADERS’ CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE
REVIVED
The currently dominant view of the corporation ignores history, is
harmful and unfair, and should be rejected in favor of the view that existed
for the United States’ first 150 years. Corporate leaders should be required
to manage their corporations in the public interest as compensation for the
state’s granting their corporations limited liability. Without limited liability,
the corporation could not exist. Only because of limited liability can a
corporation raise sufficient sums from equity investors to complete its
projects.85 Limited liability is a valuable resource that the government
controls. As it did in the United States’ early decades, the government
should distribute this resource to corporations only on the condition that
corporations compensate the government for the valuable resource by
operating in the public interest.
A way to assure that corporations implement this duty to serve the
public interest would be to impose the duty not only on the corporation itself,
but also on the corporation’s officers and directors. In other situations where
the government distributes benefits to professionals, the professionals are
required to promote the public interest.86 For example, state governments
82. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (recognizing
that “First Amendment protection extends to corporations . . . [in] the context of political
speech”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. 682, 688–91, (2014) (holding that
owners of a closely held for-profit corporation are exempt from a federal regulation that they
find objectionable pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
83. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 25–26.
84. LAMOREAUX & NOVAK, supra note 41, at 26.
85. See supra Part III (discussing the development of limited liability).
86. See supra Part I (discussing how in some professions other than business,
professionals are required to work not only for their own interests, but also for the public
interest).
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provide lawyers with the valuable monopoly right to sell legal services; no
one other than lawyers can provide such services. In return, lawyers are
required to act as “officers of the court,” and to act in the public interest.87
Furthermore, they are held to a higher standard of behavior than nonlawyers: the state will deny a legal license to a person who has been
convicted of a serious crime.88
Similarly, certified public accountants have a duty to act in the public
interest.89 Again, this is appropriate because the government has provided
the accountants with the large benefit of the monopoly right to perform
certain accounting services.90
Corporate officers and directors too should have a duty to lead their
corporations in the public interest. The states have provided corporations
with the valuable benefit of limited liability. Like lawyers and accountants,
corporate officers should be required to reciprocate by acting in the public
interest. Because the state has provided the corporation with the benefit of
limited liability, the corporation’s leader has a duty to run the corporation to
benefit the public.
Perhaps this duty should be described in a way that resembles how the
duty for lawyers is described. A lawyer is called an “officer of the court.”
A corporate officer or director might be called an “officer of the public.”
This duty for corporate leaders to manage their corporations as officers
of the public would help protect groups that are vulnerable to corporations’
behavior. A corporation might protect communities that surround its
factories by not immediately closing less-profitable factories. Cigarette
manufactures might choose to leave the cigarette business, even if the
business were profitable.
The penalties for violating this duty would be the same penalties that
punish lawyers and accountants who violate their respective ethical duties.
Just as some criminal acts disqualify a person from serving as a lawyer, a
person’s acts that harm the public interest should disqualify said person from
serving as a director or officer of a corporation. If a corporate leader causes
their corporation to harm the public interest, the government should have the
authority both to remove them from their corporate position and to eliminate
their corporation’s limited liability.
Although federal or state courts, especially Delaware courts, might
impose this duty as part of the common law, the duty might be best imposed
at the federal level, by federal statute. Otherwise, state courts and state
87.
88.
89.
90.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
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legislatures have a strong economic interest not to impose such a
requirement. A state that did impose such a requirement would be at a
disadvantage in the market for incorporations in which states compete to
attract corporations to incorporate there. For example, Delaware might fear
that it would lose its dominance in this market if it imposed a requirement
that corporations promote the public interest. Corporations would
reincorporate in other states that did not impose the requirement. To assure
that the requirement governs all corporations in all states, federal legislation
might be necessary.91
This is not an extreme proposal. Instead, the proposal would return
corporate governance to the requirements that existed for the United States’
first 150 years.92 Until the mid-1950s, it was understood that corporations
should operate in the public interest.93 The current prevailing approach of
hard profit maximization is extreme, deviating from a system that had existed
for almost 200 years. My proposal is conservative: it would return corporate
governance to its moderate mainstream.
VII. CURRENT RESPONSES ARE INADEQUATE
In the last decades, and even more recently, there have been halting
suggestions that corporations assume obligations to more than shareholders.
As discussed in the introduction and bibliographical appendix, scholars have
made various proposals.94 Two other approaches have arisen from industry
itself. First, some companies have chosen to become “benefit corporations,”
also called B corporations. Second, a group of corporate leaders has
suggested that corporations should have duties to more than shareholders. I
discuss each in turn and explain why both are inadequate to achieve the goal
of appropriate corporate responsibility.
A. Benefit Corporations
Benefit Corporations are normal corporations that have voluntarily
91. For a related proposal, see generally RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION (1976) (advocating for the federal chartering of corporations that employ at
least 10,000 individuals or sell a minimum of $250 million worth of goods and services per
annum).
92. See supra Parts III-IV (discussing the development of corporate governance in the
United States).
93. See supra Part IV (discussing the prevailing notion in the pre-WWII world that
corporations should operate in the public interest).
94. See supra notes 11–26 and accompanying text (discussing the existing literature
concerning corporations serving the public interest).
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committed to serving interests other than those of shareholders. Indeed:
Just what is a benefit corporation? A for benefit corporation has the same
structure as a traditional for-profit corporation. Each has a board of directors,
officers, and shareholders who own shares in the company. The officers and
directors run the business, yet the shareholders can hold them accountable
for the decisions they make. Shareholders have several means to do this,
including filing a shareholder lawsuit.
The difference between a traditional corporation and a benefit
corporation is in its purpose. A traditional for-profit corporation’s purpose
is to make profits for shareholders. This means that corporate managers are
judged based on the company’s financial performance. They may face
shareholder action if they make decisions that sacrifice profits to achieve
nonmonetary goals.
A benefit corporation still has a profit-making goal, but it also has a
broader public benefit purpose: to make a material positive impact on society
and the environment. Managers must work to achieve this purpose and
therefore they have flexibility to make decisions that balance profits with
social causes and environmental responsibility.
The first benefit corporation law was enacted in Maryland in 2010, and
currently about 30 states allow them. A benefit corporation is best suited to
a company that has an important social or environmental mission but also
wants to generate profits. For example, Yonkers, NY-based Greyston
Bakery was founded in the early 1980s to give hard-to-employ people a new
chance in life. It is profitable, has stayed true to its mission, and has
developed new community programs. It reorganized as New York’s first
benefit corporation in 2012.95
Additionally, while it may vary from state to state, forming a benefit
corporation is no more difficult than forming a normal C corporation:
Benefit corporation laws vary somewhat from state to state but, in
general, a benefit corporation must have a general benefit purpose
stated in its articles of incorporation. A B corporation is formed
by filing articles of incorporation with the state—the same as with
a traditional corporation.
In most states, a BENEFIT ORGANIZATION must demonstrate
that it is upholding its public benefit purpose by publishing an
annual benefit report that assesses social and environmental
performance using a third-party standard. The report must be sent
to shareholders and published on the company’s website. State
95. Jane Haskins, What is a Benefit Corporation?, LEGAL ZOOM (last updated Feb. 18,
2021), https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/what-is-a-benefit-corporation [https://perma.cc/
CXM9-VAL6].
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law also may require it to be filed with the state.
Because they may sacrifice profits in order to achieve social
goals, for-benefit companies may not be as popular with investors
as traditional profit-centered corporations. Owners of benefit
corporations may have to develop a strategy to attract investors
that value contributions to social or environmental causes as
highly as they value profits.96
Whether a given benefit corporation achieves the goals that it
establishes for itself is based on the honor system; by itself, registering as a
benefit corporation does not require the corporation to achieve these goals.
However, the corporation may also agree to monitoring by an outside entity.
For example, the corporation may not only become a benefit corporation, but
also become certified by an outside organization as a certified B Corporation:
Another way to show that a business is focused on environmental
and social goals is to apply for B CORP. CERTIFICATION through
the nonprofit organization B Lab. Certification is available to all
types of businesses, including traditional corporations and LLCs.
Some businesses, like King Arthur Flour Company and Greyston
Bakery, are organized as benefit corporations and also are B
Lab certified B corporations.
Certification involves completing an assessment that evaluates
the company’s overall impact on its stakeholders. The assessment
is then reviewed by B Lab staff members, who may require
supporting documentation.
Some companies must amend
corporate formation documents or bylaws to include a general
benefit purpose. B Lab also offers a free tool that can assist
companies in meeting their annual benefit corporation reporting
requirements.
Forming a benefit corporation can help a company fulfill a
social purpose without risking shareholder action for placing
social good ahead of profits. Certification and reporting
requirements help business managers assess progress and set new
goals. And, in an era where so many are trying to be authentic and
sustainable, becoming a BENEFIT COMPANY helps you stand out
from the crowd by demonstrating your commitment to your
employees, your community, and the environment.97
That some corporations may choose to become benefit corporations is
admirable. However, the existence of benefit corporations does not achieve
the goal of imposing a duty to serve the public interest on all corporations.

96. Id.
97. Id.
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A corporation becomes a benefit corporation only if its organizers choose to
do so. The large majority of companies that do not choose to become a
benefit corporation have no enhanced duty to the public.98
B. The Business Roundtable’s Statement
The Business Roundtable is an association whose members are CEOs
of major U.S. corporations.99 For decades, the group indicated that the goal
of a corporation should be to promote the interests of the corporation’s
shareholders.100 However, in 2019, the group issued a statement that
suggested that corporations should consider the interests of a broader group
of stakeholders. The “Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation”
provided:
Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to succeed
through hard work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning and
dignity. We believe the free-market system is the best means of
98. Other scholars have noted the limited benefits of B corporations in achieving the
public interest. For example, scholars note that the ability of stakeholders to control a B
corporation’s directors is rather limited, inevitably resulting in the excessive decision-making
freedom of B corporation directors. Additionally, the expansion of director duties to consider
the shareholder and non-shareholder interests often cause conflicts in the course of making
corporate decisions. See Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct
for Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit,
101 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1751–53, (2017) (“However, while benefit corporations may be
growing in popularity, they do not come without a set of risks and complications, specifically
relating to the expanded director duties. . . . As many scholars have rightly recognized, current
benefit corporation legislation lacks guidance for director duties regarding how to make
decisions based on the divided loyalties to shareholders and stakeholders. . . . Regrettably,
existing legal scholarship has failed to address this problem in a systematic way. . . . Due to
the requirement for pursuing a public benefit, directors of benefit corporations must
understand their duties so they can fulfill their obligations to company stakeholders and
promote the greater good. . . . With novel fiduciary duties for directors and no current case
law for breach of benefit corporation fiduciary duty or benefit corporation governance, it is
important to clarify director duty and provide guidance; otherwise, the new corporate entity
may ultimately prove unsuccessful. This Note seeks to overcome the gap in the legal literature
by providing a novel solution that will guide benefit corporation directors as they navigate
this complicated terrain. . . . [The author] explores and analyzes five important shortcomings
of the current director duty provisions within several state benefit corporation statutes. . . .”
The author does not mention limited liability).
99. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (last visited Feb. 27, 2021), https://www.businessroundtable
.org [https://perma.cc/8X6X-CP3G].
100. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019), https://w
ww.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-p
romote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/H9QS-X6DC].
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generating good jobs, a strong and sustainable economy,
innovation, a healthy environment and economic opportunity for
all.
Businesses play a vital role in the economy by creating jobs,
fostering innovation and providing essential goods and services.
Businesses make and sell consumer products; manufacture
equipment and vehicles; support the national defense; grow and
produce food; provide health care; generate and deliver energy;
and offer financial, communications and other services that
underpin economic growth.
While each of our individual companies serves its own
corporate purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of
our stakeholders. We commit to:
Delivering value to our customers. We will further the tradition
of American companies leading the way in meeting or exceeding
customer expectations.
Investing in our employees. This starts with compensating
them fairly and providing important benefits. It also includes
supporting them through training and education that help develop
new skills for a rapidly changing world. We foster diversity and
inclusion, dignity and respect.
Dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers. We are
dedicated to serving as good partners to the other companies, large
and small, that help us meet our missions.
Supporting the communities in which we work. We respect the
people in our communities and protect the environment by
embracing sustainable practices across our businesses.
Generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the
capital that allows companies to invest, grow and innovate. We
are committed to transparency and effective engagement with
shareholders.
Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver
value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, our
communities and our country.101
101. The press release for the statement indicated:
Since 1978, Business Roundtable has periodically issued Principles of Corporate
Governance. Each version of the document issued since 1997 has endorsed
principles of shareholder primacy – that corporations exist principally to serve
shareholders. With today’s announcement, the new Statement supersedes
previous statements and outlines a modern standard for corporate responsibility.
“The American dream is alive, but fraying,” said Jamie Dimon, Chairman
and CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chairman of Business Roundtable.
“Major employers are investing in their workers and communities because they
know it is the only way to be successful over the long term. These modernized
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As with the benefit corporation, the Business Roundtable’s statement is
merely aspirational. It does not require corporations to do anything. It is a
suggestion by some powerful CEOs that they might consider the interests of
stakeholders other than shareholders. It does not require the CEOs to
consider these other interests.
Moreover, the statement is unenforceable. If a CEO were to ignore
other stakeholders’ interests and continue to focus solely on shareholders’
interests, neither the CEO nor their corporation could be punished. No one
would be able to sue to enforce any rights of other stakeholders.
Looked at most favorably, the statement is a statement of aspiration that
might inspire some corporate leaders to think more broadly beyond
shareholder maximization. A more cynical view would be that the statement
is public relations hot air, which is designed to make corporations seem more
appealing, while requiring them to do nothing.
The statement does not appear to have marked a dramatic turning point
in corporate behavior. Indeed, a recent study shows that, more than a year
after the statement was issued, those companies whose executives signed the
statement have done no better in serving the public interest than those whose

principles reflect the business community’s unwavering commitment to continue
to push for an economy that serves all Americans.”
“This new statement better reflects the way corporations can and should
operate today,” added Alex Gorsky, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of Johnson & Johnson and Chair of the Business Roundtable Corporate
Governance Committee. ”It affirms the essential role corporations can play in
improving our society when CEOs are truly committed to meeting the needs of
all stakeholders.”
Industry leaders also lent their support for the updated Business Roundtable
Statement, citing the positive impact this commitment will have on long-term
value creation:
“I welcome this thoughtful statement by Business Roundtable CEOs on the
Purpose of a Corporation. By taking a broader, more complete view of corporate
purpose, boards can focus on creating long-term value, better serving everyone –
investors, employees, communities, suppliers and customers,” said Bill McNabb,
former CEO of Vanguard.
“CEOs work to generate profits and return value to shareholders, but the bestrun companies do more. They put the customer first and invest in their employees
and communities. In the end, it’s the most promising way to build long-term
value,” said Tricia Griffith, President and CEO of Progressive Corporation.
“This is tremendous news because it is more critical than ever that businesses
in the 21st century are focused on generating long-term value for all stakeholders
and addressing the challenges we face, which will result in shared prosperity and
sustainability for both business and society,” said Darren Walker, President of
the Ford Foundation.
Id.
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executives did not sign it.102 Corporations whose executives signed the
statement did not change their objectives beyond shareholder primacy.103
This failure is easy to understand. As before, a CEO who focused on
something other than profits might soon be out of a job. Disgruntled
shareholders would have them fired. Alternatively, the resultant declining
stock price would make the corporation an enticing takeover target, which
again would result in the CEO being fired.
As with the benefit corporation, the statement allows corporate
leadership to continue on as before, but with a new public relations halo.
VIII. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY
Various stakeholders of corporations are uniquely unprotected from
their vulnerability to the corporations.104 Often, a corporation holds large
power over the workers and surrounding community, and they are at the
corporation’s mercy. Workers and the surrounding community must make
large investments in the corporation, which, under traditional law, the
corporation can destroy at its whim, with no recourse for the workers and
community.105

102. KKS ADVISORS, COVID-19 and Inequality: A Test of Corporate Purpose (Sept.
2020), https://337827c9-ebc5-4704-b7bd-0ba2e859ee47.filesusr.com/ugd/f64551_cad4d1c1
808343258f2b57fb8fff90d9.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M5A-RA3W] (“Since the pandemic’s
inception, BRT Signatories did not outperform their S&P 500 or European company
counterparts on this test of corporate purpose.”); Peter S. Goodman, Stakeholder Capitalism
Gets a Report Card. It’s Not Good., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/09/22/business/business-roudtable-stakeholder-capitalism.html?searchResultPosition=
2 [https://perma.cc/A9MB-KVSG].
103. Id.
104. This section draws on vulnerability theory, created by Martha Fineman.
Vulnerability theory offers an alternative approach to state responsibility and social justice.
See generally PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Martha Albertson Fineman, Ulrika Andersson & Titti Mattsson
eds., 2017) (examining how privatization and globalization impact contemporary feminist and
social justice approaches to public responsibility); VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL
ORGANIZATION OF WORK (Martha Albertson Fineman & Jonathan W. Fineman eds., 2018)
(analyzing individuals and institutions in the context of the employment relationship via the
concepts of vulnerability and resilience); VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2014)
(considering how the concept of vulnerability might provide a new ethical foundation for law
and politics).
105. See supra Part II (discussing the modern corporation’s focus on benefiting
shareholders while simultaneously ignoring the interests of its other vulnerable stakeholders).
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A. Employees of the Corporation
Employees of a corporation must often make large investments in the
corporation, the value of which the corporation can easily destroy. For
example, workers often must move to a new community when the
corporation hires them, cutting off valuable ties with their former
communities.
Likewise, workers must invest in the specific skills that the corporation
requires, skills which often will not be transferable to another corporation.
The workers and their families establish valuable social ties with
institutions in the community, such as schools and churches.
The workers buy houses in the community.
The value of all of these investments will decline or even be completely
lost if the corporation decides to close its local plant. If the workers are
forced to move, the workers’ ties to the community will be lost. The value
of the workers’ non-transferable employer-specific skills will be destroyed.
Likewise, if the corporation closes, this will cause the value of the real estate
in the surrounding area to decline, decimating the value of the former
workers’ homes.
Examples of this are the many workers in the industrial middle of the
United States, whose lives were shattered when corporations closed
manufacturing plants.
B. The Surrounding Community
Apart from the workers, the community surrounding a major corporate
employer is also unprotected from its vulnerability. Families and businesses
invest in the community. If the corporation leaves, the whole community is
devastated.
Likewise, if the corporation begins emitting larger amounts of
pollution, the community is often defenseless. Because the community
depends so deeply on the corporation, the community can neither confront
the corporation nor defend itself against the corporation, for fear that the
corporation will leave.
Examples of communities that have been devastated by corporate
decisions are present through the U.S.’s industrial middle.
C. The Environment
Because the corporation holds power over the surrounding community,
the surrounding community cannot effectively demand that the corporation

2021]

NOT JUST PROFITS

855

reduce pollution. The community fears that environmental activism will
cause the corporation to leave for another area or another country.
Accordingly, the environment enjoys few protections against its
vulnerability.
D. Unions
Because the corporation can threaten to leave, the corporation has
effective power to destroy unions. Unions have declined as corporations
have moved their factories from union areas in the U.S.’s north to non-union
areas in the south. Workers have gotten the message: if you try to organize
a union, the corporation will leave and destroy your community.
This is what happened when Amazon suddenly revoked its commitment
to build a large headquarters near New York City. The community had made
various requests that Amazon protect workers and the environment. Rather
than agree to them, Amazon left. To workers and communities, the message
is clear. If you request protections from a corporation, your jobs and
community are at risk.
The duty that I propose in this paper would permit corporations’
workers and communities to enjoy some resilience and to be protected to
some degree from their vulnerability to corporations. Corporate law
presently provides many protections to shareholders who have invested in a
corporation. My proposal provides protections to the workers and
communities who have invested in a corporation not just with money, but
with their lives. My proposal would require a corporation to consider the
interests of all investors in it, including workers and the surrounding
community, not just shareholders.
The proposal would also be fair and efficient. Just as it is fair and
efficient for shareholders to expect a reliable return on their money
investment in the corporation, the corporation should be required to attempt
to provide its workers and the surrounding community with a similar reliable
return on their nontransferable investment—or, at minimum, to consider in
the corporation’s decision-making the workers’ and community’s interests.
IX. CONCLUSION
Over the past century, corporations have freed themselves of a duty that
they previously had: the duty to promote the public interest. The recent
development of the benefit corporation does not change this. Any publicspirited acts that corporations take as benefit corporations are purely
voluntary. A corporation can choose not to be a benefit corporation. If it

856

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:3

chooses to be a benefit corporation, it still has complete discretion whether
to act in the public interest.
Likewise, the recent statement by the Business Roundtable does not
impose any new duties. It merely suggests that corporate leaders might
aspire to promote the interest of “stakeholders” other than stockholders.
However, the statement does not specify how exactly the leaders should do
this. Nor does it provide any enforcement or penalties if they don’t.
Instead, a new duty should be created for corporate leaders to act in the
public interest. Just as lawyers are required to be “officers of the court,”
corporate leaders should be “officers of the public.” Just as some criminal
acts disqualify a person from serving as a lawyer, acts that harm the public
interest should disqualify people from serving as directors and officers of
corporations. If a corporate leader harms the public interest, the government
should have the authority both to remove them from their corporate position
and to eliminate their corporation’s limited liability.
Furthermore, if corporations violate this duty to act in the public
interest, limited liability should be eliminated for that corporation’s
shareholders. If the corporation fails to provide the quid, then the
corporation and its shareholders should no longer receive the quo.
This new duty could be created by the courts. For example, the
Delaware courts could hold that corporate directors and officers have a
fiduciary duty that runs not only to the corporation, but also to other
stakeholders. Just as lawyers and accountants have duties beyond serving
their clients, corporate leaders would also have duties to serve the public
interest.
Alternately, this public duty could be achieved through legislation. It
could be done at the state level. For example, the Delaware legislature could
pass a statute that imposes the new duty.
The duty could also be imposed by federal legislation.106 There would
be benefits of this. With federal legislation, the duty would be consistent
across all jurisdictions. In contrast, market forces would probably prevent
this duty from arising in the states, either in state legislatures or state courts.
106. Other papers have proposed modifications at the federal level. See Margaret Ryznar
& Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social
Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1679 (2015) (“There are two primary but different
methods of controlling behavior, whether it is the behavior of individuals or corporations: to
incentivize it or to regulate it. Governments are in a unique position to employ either or both
options because of their ability to pass regulatory schemes and to extend tax incentives. . . .
Given the fact that the conflict minerals provision is a mere ‘name and shame’ statute, the
market, rather than the government, is the force asserting pressure on companies to
responsibly source the four minerals listed in the conflict minerals provision of Dodd-Frank.”
The authors do not mention limited liability.).
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No state would act individually to impose such a duty for fear of losing
incorporations to other states that do not impose the duty. Accordingly, the
best way to impose the duty would be through federal legislation, which
applies to all states, and which gives no state an advantage in the market for
incorporations.
However, there would also be harms to federal legislation. The
development of the law would not enjoy the benefits of competitive
federalism, where each state attempts to improve its law to attempt to attract
businesses to incorporate in the state. Up to now, the federal courts and
federal legislature have chosen not to create national corporate law. Yet this
might be a situation that nonetheless requires federal legislation.
The new duty would introduce complications for courts. The existing
duty only to shareholders is easy to administer. In contrast, if duties were
extended to other groups, courts would need to develop rules regarding how
to balance a corporation’s duties to its shareholders and its duties to the
public. It will not be simple to decide a corporation’s duty where a corporate
decision would help shareholders but harm the public, or vice versa. An
example would be a corporation’s decision whether to close an unprofitable
factory. Likewise, a corporate leader might camouflage the leader’s selfinterest in the cloak of the interests of workers. For example, the leader
might explain a decision not to close a factory on the beach in San Diego as
being to protect the workers, while the real reason is that the corporate leader
likes to live near the beach.107
But the easy route is not always the best route. The complicated rule is
sometimes the better rule. In many areas, the Supreme Court employs
complicated balancing tests because a simple rule would create injustice. A
simple rule can be grossly unjust. Centuries ago, an earlier simple rule
provided that parents could completely control their children, including the
right with impunity to beat their children, or even kill them. Fortunately, this
simple, easy-to-administer rule has yielded to the present, more-complicated
system where the rights of parents to control a child must be balanced against
the child’s independent rights.
Similarly, the main virtue of the rule that creates a duty for a corporation
only to shareholders is simplicity. But the virtue of the rule’s simplicity of
administration is dwarfed by the harms of the rule’s flaws and injustices.
Even though the rule that I propose will be harder to administer, the effort
will be worth it, eliminating stark injustices that the present rule creates.
107. See Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015
6:46 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corporations-obli
gations-to-shareholders/a-duty-to-shareholder-value
[https://perma.cc/8HW2-6EDN]
(discussing a board’s duties to its shareholders).
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Moreover, that the difficulties will not be insuperable is shown by the
fact that my proposed rule is merely a return to a system that earlier
functioned well. Mine is a conservative proposal. I seek merely to reimpose
on corporations the public duties that governed them until the Gilded Age.
The brutally simple rule that conservative corporate apologists and their
high-paid lawyers have pushed through is an aberration from the moderate,
fairer approach that prevailed earlier.
My proposed duty would provide non-shareholder corporate
stakeholders with some resilience from their unique vulnerability to
corporate decisions. Like shareholders, a corporation’s workers and the
surrounding community make large investments in the corporation. Rather
than the investments being in money, the workers and communities invest in
the corporation their whole selves. They build their lives around corporation,
and they learn the nontransferable skills that are necessary to serve the
corporation.
Under present law, a corporation, with impunity, can destroy these
investments that workers and the community have made. The U.S.’s
industrial mid-west is evidence of the devastation that corporations cause
when they are permitted to focus only on the interests of shareholders and to
ignore the interests of vulnerable shareholders and communities. My
proposal would extend legal protections not only to investors who are
shareholders, but also to the workers and communities who have invested in
the corporation, not with money, but with their lives.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
In addition to the sources discussed in the introduction, other papers
employ the following theories to demonstrate that a corporation has direct
duties to stakeholders:
1. Social/Corporate Contract Theory. Some scholars have tried to
construct and analyze the social responsibility of corporations from the
perspective of a social contract, human rights, and the political social
contract.108 In addition, they argue that the fiduciary duty can be used to fill
108. Olufemi Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social Contract, Corporate
Personhood and Human Rights Law: Understanding the Emerging Responsibilities of
Modern Corporations, 33 AUSTL. J. LEG PHIL. 100, 100 (2008) (“Business ethicists and
philosophers have tried to construct and analyze the social responsibility of corporations from
a social contract perspective without linking it to human rights or the political social contract.
. . . [T]here is no need for a separate social contract between society and business and that a
proper understanding of the legal status of today’s corporation would recognize them as new
entrants into the existing social contract. The consequence of this for international human
rights law will be that corporations as ‘persons’ will stand in the same position as natural
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gaps in corporate contracts. The substance of this gap-filling principle
should be maximizing value of diversified portfolio, rather than shareholder
value maximization.109
2. Distributive Justice. Some scholars argue that corporate directors
might exercise their social duties through distributive justice, which enables
the stakeholders to participate in the dissemination of value according to
their contributions to the benefits and their adoption of risk.110
3. Fairness. Some articles challenge whether corporate managers
should focus on profits. The articles’ arguments are based on fairness,
rejecting libertarian or conservative tenets.111
4. Kant’s “Duty of Beneficence.” Other articles suggest that
shareholders have a duty to hold management to account for the moral
consequences of the firm’s activities on stakeholders. They add pursuing the
happiness of non-shareholders to the ethical framework of shareholder
theory.112
5. Theories Based on Strategies to Maximize Long-Term Profit. Some
articles argue that directors’ duties to the public are a strategy to pursue
substantial benefit for corporations and particularly to achieve stated shortterm or long-term goals.113
persons under the law.” The author does not mention limited liability.).
109. See generally Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999) (“A
hypothetical contract analysis of fiduciary duty requires a corporate law norm that the total
value of financial claims against the firm be maximized. . . . The analysis shows some
inadequacies in the ‘shareholder value maximization’ norm that is assumed in most corporate
law literature. The norm of maximizing firm value fits best with an abstract conception of
fiduciary duty in which the duty is owed to the corporation, rather than to shareholders or any
other particular class of security holders. Adopting this conception dissolves many of the
fiduciary duty puzzles posed by derivative securities.” The author does not mention limited
liability.).
110. See generally Charlotte Villiers, Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors
or Distributive Justice. 10 J. CORP L STUD. 309 (2010) (seeking to offer an alternative
proposal for setting and monitoring executive pay. The author does not mention limited
liability).
111. Alan R. Palmiter, Corporate Governance as Moral Psychology, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1119, 1119 (2017) (propounding that “Corporate governance is best seen not as a subset
of economics or even law, but instead as a subset of moral psychology.” The author does not
mention limited liability.)
112. See generally Samuel Mansell, Shareholder Theory and Kant’s ‘Duty of
Beneficence’, 117 J. BUS. ETHICS. 583 (2013) (concluding that it is possible within the ethical
framework of shareholder theory for managers to pursue directly the happiness of nonshareholders).
113. See AUGUSTINE CHENNATTU, MANAGING WITH INTEGRITY: AN ETHICAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INTEGRITY 75
(2020) (identifying four different theories regarding corporate social responsibility, namely
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6. Social Responsiveness Theories. Some scholars define corporate
social responsiveness as whether a corporation is able to respond to various
social pressures. This in turn depends on its ability to manage its relations
with various social groups.114
7. Normative Stakeholder Theory. Other authors argue that stakeholder
and shareholder theories are not in conflict with one another. They advocate
stakeholder-focused management as profit-maximizing. Acting in this way
achieves overall cooperation between various stakeholder groups, increasing
the corporation’s profits, because “those whom the corporation affects, will
affect the corporation back.”115
8. Sustainable Corporate Vision. Likewise, some papers argue that, in
the long-term, corporate sustainability requires corporations to satisfy
stakeholders’ economic, environmental, and social needs.116
Some scholars argue that corporate managers should have profit
sacrificing discretion even if the law generally requires corporate profitmaximization. Total agency costs require giving managers a businessjudgment-rule deference that necessarily confers such discretion.117
“profit motivated theories, power motivated theories, socially motivated theories, and ethical
theories. Profit motivated theories hold that corporate social responsibility is to increase
shareholder value. Power motivated theories perceive that since corporations enjoy social
power in society, they have to be responsible to society. Socially motivated theories say that
since the existence, continuity, and growth of business depend on society, business must
consider and fulfill social demands. Ethically motivated corporate social responsibility
theories concentrate on ethical principles that determine the link between business and
society. [The author] conclude this section with a suggestion that we need more powerful
individual and corporate centered corporate socially responsible theories rather than corporate
centered socially responsible theories.” The author does not mention limited liability).
114. Id. at 32.
115. Id. at 92.
116. Id. at 94.
117. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N. Y. U. L.
REV. 733, 733–34 (2005) (arguing against the canonical law and economics’ view holding
that “corporate managers do and should have a duty to profit-maximize because such conduct
is socially efficient given that general legal sanctions do or can redress any harm that corporate
or noncorporate businesses inflict on others.” This “canonical view is mistaken both
descriptively and normatively. In fact, the law gives corporate managers considerable implicit
and explicit discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest. They would have such
discretion even if the law pursued the normative goal of corporate profit-maximization. . . .
Pure profit-maximization would worsen corporate conduct by overriding these social and
moral sanctions. In addition to being socially inefficient, pure profit-maximization would
harm shareholder welfare whenever shareholders value the incremental profits less than
avoiding social and moral sanctions . . . in public corporations, optimizing corporate conduct
requires giving managers some operational discretion to sacrifice profits in the public interest
even without shareholder approval because, unlike shareholders, managers are sufficiently
exposed to social and moral sanctions. . . . Managerial discretion to sacrifice profits is further
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In contrast to this paper’s emphasis on the importance of courts and
legislatures to broadening the scope of fiduciary duties of directors, some
papers suggest that stakeholders should instead be benefitted by
strengthening stakeholder bargaining power. Rather than focusing on the
law of corporate governance, the scholars argue that states should strengthen
unions and collective bargaining, tighten environmental laws, and provide
safety nets for communities affected by downsizing. 118
In contrast to this paper’s recommendation that corporations’ duties to
stakeholders should be mandatory, some papers argue that the law should be
able to choose: corporations should begin as stakeholder-centered but then
have a choice to focus on the shareholder.119 This is in accord with the
benefits corporation movement, discussed above. Also, some scholars prefer
a mandated corporate social responsibility structure, which is a hybrid model
of both legislature and market force. They contend that if the law conflicts
with corporations’ purpose of profit maximization, corporations would seek
to circumvent it and be able to undermine the intent of the law.120
constrained by legal limits on the amount of profit sacrificing, which become much tighter
when market constraints are inoperable because of last-period problems. Managers should
have donative discretion because courts cannot distinguish profit-enhancing donations from
profit sacrificing ones. . . . This explains the legal requirement that corporate donations have
a nexus to corporate operations. Antitakeover laws can partly be explained as necessary to
preserve sufficient managerial discretion to consider social and moral norms.” The author
does not mention limited liability).
118. Robert John Schulze, Review: Can This Marriage Be Saved? Reconciling
Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 1607, 1607
(1997) (“Robert Schulze examines a collection of critiques of the corporate law theory
paradigm. Although the current paradigm focuses on maximizing shareholder profits to
optimize societal wealth, these critique essays argue that this focus ultimately fails to meet
societal needs. According to these authors, corporate law should concomitantly protect other
corporate constituents, such as labor, consumers, the environment, local communities, and
unsophisticated investors. Although Schulze finds that some of these critiques powerfully
challenge the current paradigm, he argues that their reforms would not ameliorate the concerns
highlighted and would probably fail in practice. He concludes that other policy interventions
may more effectively answer the authors’ criticisms.” The author does not mention limited
liability.).
119. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L. J. 1085, 1085–86 (2000) (“Both legal and economic
changes result from redefining the duties of corporate directors, ultimately transforming
American business. . . . An opt-out statute would create a default rule that makes
consideration of non-shareholder interests mandatory upon incorporation, but allows
shareholders to amend the articles to favor themselves if they so choose.” Authors do not
mention limited liability.).
120. See Ryznar & Woody, supra note 106, at 1693 (“Corporations seek to circumvent
regulations if the regulations conflict with profit maximization, as they often do. When
corporations are effective in dodging regulations, they are able to undermine the intent of
the regulations.”).

